

Oisín N. Deery

(‘Oisín’ is pronounced ‘Oh-Sheen’)

Curriculum Vitae

Department(s) of Philosophy
York University (Toronto)
Macquarie University (Sydney)

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AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION & COMPETENCE

AOS: Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind/Cognitive Science

AOC: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Ethics/Moral Psychology

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Assistant Professor, 2019–present, Department of Philosophy, York University

Lecturer (Assistant Professor), 2020–present & ARC DECRA Fellow 2020–23, Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University

Adjunct Research Fellow, 2019–present, Department of Philosophy, Monash University

Lecturer, 2017–19, Department of Philosophy, Monash University

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 2016–17, Department of Philosophy, Florida State University

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 2014–16, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 2013–14, Université de Montréal

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, 2013, University of British Columbia

M.A. in Philosophy, 2006, University College Cork, Ireland

B.A. in Philosophy and English, 1993, National University of Ireland, Galway

BOOKS

2021 *Naturally Free Action*, Oxford University Press.

2013 Paul Russell & Oisín Deery (eds.), *The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates*, Oxford University Press.

PEER-REVIEWED PAPERS

2022 Oisín Deery & Katherine Bailey, “The Bias Dilemma: The Ethics of Algorithmic Bias in Natural-Language Processing,” *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* 8 (3/4): Article 1.

2022 Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias, “Why the Manipulation Argument Fails: Determinism Does Not Entail Perfect Prediction,” *Philosophical Studies*, doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01882-7.

- 2021 “Free Actions As a Natural Kind,” *Synthese*, 198: 823–843.
- 2017 Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias, “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” *Philosophical Studies*, 174(5): 1255–1276.
- 2015 “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 93(2): 319–334.
- 2015 “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will,” *Philosophical Studies*, 172(8): 2033–2054.
- 2015 Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” *Philosophical Psychology*, 28(6): 776–801.
- 2015 Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey, “Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris,” *Philosophical Psychology*, 28(6): 808–814.
- 2015 “Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?” *Philosophical Explorations*, 18(1): 2–19.
- 2013 “Absences and Late Preemption,” *Theoria*, 79(4): 309–325.
- 2013 Oisín Deery, Matt Bedke & Shaun Nichols, “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” in D. Shoemaker (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1*, Oxford University Press. 126–150.
- 2007 “Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame,” *Res Publica: A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy*, 13(3): 209–230.

BOOK CHAPTERS

- 2023 Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias, “The Experience of Free Will,” in J. Campbell (ed.), *A Companion to Free Will*, Wiley-Blackwell.
- 2022 Oisín Deery, “Introduction,” in O. Deery (ed.) Special Issue on “New Work on Agency and Responsibility,” *Humana.Mente* 15(42): iii–xix.
- 2018 Oisín Deery & Katherine Bailey, “Ethics, Bias and Statistical Models,” Input paper for the Horizon Scanning Project, *The Effective and Ethical Development of Artificial Intelligence: An Opportunity to Improve Our Wellbeing*, on behalf of the Australian Council of Learned Academies (ACOLA).
- 2013 Paul Russell & Oisín Deery, “Introduction,” in P. Russell & O. Deery (eds.), *The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates*, Oxford University Press.

EDITORIAL WORK

- 2022 Guest Editor for special issue of *Humana.Mente* on “New Work on Agency and Responsibility” (December 2022)

BOOK REVIEWS

- 2015 Review of D. Hodgson, *Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will* (Oxford University Press, 2012), *Mind*, 124(493): 347–351.
- 2013 Review of J. Alexander, *Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction* (Polity, 2012), *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 21(5): 787–791.

POSTDOCTORAL AWARDS & FELLOWSHIPS (in addition to fellowships listed above)

- 2020 Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DECRA), Australian Research Council, 3-year full-time research fellowship (2020–23), Macquarie University

SPECIAL RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS

- 2023 Author-Meets-Critics Symposium on *Naturally Free Action* by Oisín Deery, Commenters: Al Mele (Florida State University), Terry Horgan (University of Arizona), and Marcela Herdova (Florida State University), Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, April 5-8
- 2023 Society for Philosophy of Agency Book Symposium (Affiliated Group Session) on *Naturally Free Action* by Oisín Deery, Commenters: Robyn Repko Waller (Iona College) & Myrto Mylopoulos (Carleton University), Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Montréal, January 4-7

REFEREED RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS

- 2022 “Conscious Control: Can A.I. Systems Act Freely Or Be Blameworthy for What They Do?” Free Will, Consciousness, Cognition: Interdisciplinary Research in Philosophy, A.I., Neuroscience, and Physics, University of Tyumen, Russian Federation, April 29–30 (paper) (*cancelled due to war in Ukraine*)
- 2021 “Might A.I. Agents Be Blameworthy?” Australasian Association of Philosophy, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand, July 15 (paper) (*remote due to COVID-19*)
- 2021 “The Bias Dilemma: Reframing the Debate About Algorithmic Bias,” co-authored paper with Katherine Bailey, Feminism, Social Justice, and A.I. Workshop, University of Waterloo, July 26–28 (paper) (*remote due to COVID-19*)
- 2021 “Human and Artificially Intelligent Agents: A Unified Account,” The Canadian Philosophical Association, Annual Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, June 1 (paper) (*remote due to COVID-19*)
- 2020 “Intelligence in Humans, Non-human Animals, and Machines,” 42nd Annual Virtual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, on the theme Developing a Mind: Learning in Humans, Animals, and Machines, July 29–August 1 (poster) (*remote due to COVID-19*)
- 2018 “The Concept and Phenomenology of Free Agency,” 3rd International Conference on Natural Cognition: Experience, Concepts, and Agency, University of Macau, China, November 20–21 (paper)
- 2017 “Bias in Data: The Ethical Risks of Machine Learning,” co-authored paper with Katherine Bailey, Neuroscience and Society conference at the University of Sydney & Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, September 7–8 (poster)

- 2016 “Hierarchies in the Visual System,” co-authored paper with Bryan Chambliss, 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 3–5 (paper)
- 2016 “Moral Responsibility, Situationism, and Implicit Bias,” Gothenburg Responsibility Project Conference, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, August 24–27 (paper)
- 2016 “Impaired Self-Control and Moral Responsibility,” 42nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, June 2–4 (poster)
- 2016 “Compensating for Impaired Self-Control,” Workshop on Free Will and Self-Control, University of Turku, Finland, February 26 (paper)
- 2015 “The Light Cone Limit: Determinism, Prediction, and Causation by Events in the Distant Past,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, 41st Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, June 4 (poster)
- 2014 “Neuroscience Doesn’t Reveal That There Are No Free Choices (But It Might Tell Us What Free Choice Is),” Conference on Free Will, Center for Cognition and Neuroethics, Flint, Michigan, October 10 (paper)
- 2014 “Prospection and Causal Modeling Explain People’s Belief in Indeterminist Freedom,” 40th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, June 18 (poster)
- 2014 “Causal Modeling and Free Will: A New Approach to Old Problems,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, 40th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, June 20 (paper)
- 2014 “Indeterminist Phenomenology Is the Source of People’s Belief in Indeterminist Freedom,” Toward a Science of Consciousness 20th Anniversary Conference, Tucson, Arizona, April 25 (paper)
- 2013 “Free Will and Aesthetic Judgment: A Defense of the Agency View,” co-authored paper with Joshua J. Johnston, 51st Annual Meeting of the Alabama Philosophical Society, Pensacola, Florida, October 12 (paper)
- 2012 “Intuitions in a New Light: Expanding the Methods of Experimental Philosophy,” co-authored paper with Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey, 38th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, June 22 (poster)
- 2012 “Aesthetic Judgments: The Agency View,” co-authored paper with Joshua J. Johnston, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, Pacific Grove, California, April 13 (paper)
- 2011 “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” co-authored paper with Matt Bedke & Shaun Nichols, New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, New Orleans, November 5 (paper)
- 2011 “The Experience of Agency,” Philosophy Department Workshop, Cornell University, September 15 (paper)
- 2010 “Why the Revised Manipulation Argument Fails,” 47th Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting, University of Calgary, October 29 (paper)
- 2009 “How Our Experience as Agents is Mistaken if Determinism is True,” 61st annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Forest Grove, Oregon, October 23 (paper)

INVITED RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS (inc. upcoming)

- 2019 “Bias in Machine-Learning Systems,” co-authored paper with Katherine Bailey, *Responsible A.I.* Lunchtime Talk, Eliiza, 452 Flinders Street, Melbourne, May 8

- 2018 “Practical and Ethical Problems in Controlling for Morally Relevant Bias in Algorithms,” co-authored paper with Katherine Bailey, Google Sydney, July 19
- 2018 “How to Control for Morally Relevant Bias in NLP,” co-authored paper with Katherine Bailey, Workshop on Ethics and Artificial Intelligence, North American Association for Computational Linguistics, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 6
- 2018 “Reference and Free Will,” Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, May 10
- 2018 “Naturally Free Action,” Society for Philosophy of Agency (Affiliated Group Session), Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, February 23
- 2017 “Who Needs Conscious, Rational Control? Agency and Implicit Bias,” Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, September 1
- 2017 “Moral Responsibility for Actions Caused by Implicit Attitudes,” Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, January 27
- 2016 “Free Choices Are a (Natural) Psychological Kind,” Department of Philosophy, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, February 11
- 2016 “A New Compatibilist Theory of Free Will,” Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona, Tucson, January 28
- 2015 “Methodological Naturalism about Free Choice,” Arizona Cognitive Science Conclave, University of Arizona, Tucson, December 5
- 2015 “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, March 24
- 2015 “Explaining the Phenomenology of Free Will,” Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, January 30
- 2014 “Neuroscience, Kinds, and Free Will,” Cognitive Science Colloquium at the University of Arizona, Tucson, November 21
- 2014 “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada Las Vegas, October 24
- 2014 “Moral Responsibility and Freedom,” Joint Workshop of the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto and the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal, Toronto, April 10
- 2014 “Against an Argument for Libertarianism,” Workshop at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal, January 14
- 2013 “A Causal-Modeling Approach to Manipulation Arguments and Frankfurt Cases,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal, November 29
- 2013 “Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology,” Conference on the Phenomenology of Free Will and its Epistemological Significance, Fribourg, Switzerland, June 16–19
- 2013 “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” co-authored paper with Matt Bedke & Shaun Nichols, Experimental Philosophy Society Group Session, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 27
- 2013 “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” co-authored paper with Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey, Philosophy Department Spring Colloquium, University of British Columbia, March 15

- 2012 “Two Varieties of Content for Agentive Experience,” 2nd Workshop on Concepts and Perception: Varieties of Content, Córdoba, Argentina, December 7
- 2010 “Our Experience as Agents, and Why It’s Mistaken,” Columbia College, Vancouver, April 5

REFEREED TEACHING PRESENTATIONS (inc. upcoming)

- 2021 “Using a Flipped Classroom to Teach Philosophy,” Symposium on Teaching, The Canadian Philosophical Association, Annual Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta (remote due to COVID-19), June 1 (paper)
- 2021 “Against Media Illusions: A Critical Thinking Class,” AAPT/APA Teaching Hub session, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (remote due to COVID-19), April 7 (paper)
- 2020 “Evaluating Truth: A Flipped Classroom Exercise,” AAPT/APA Teaching Hub session on Creative Assignments for Practicing Philosophical Skills, Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Philadelphia, January 9 (paper)

COMMENTS

- 2017 Comment on Xiaofei Liu, “Consequentialism and Moral Color,” Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Seattle, April 12
- 2016 Discussant (with Robert Kane) on Gregg Caruso, “Free-Will Skepticism and Creativity,” Society for the Philosophy of Creativity Group Session, Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, March 4
- 2016 Comment on Saba Bazargan, “Accountability and Intervening Agency,” Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, March 4
- 2014 Comment on Eylem Özalton, “Knowledge in Action: Less Like Pain, More Like Perception,” Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Diego, April 17 (invited)
- 2012 Comment on Ishtiyaque Haji, “Frankfurt Examples Featuring Determinism,” 49th Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting, Victoria, B.C., October 20
- 2011 Comment on Eric L. Chwang, “Freedom from Autonomy,” Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Diego, April 23

ENGAGEMENT

- 2023 Interviewee on *The Free Will Show Podcast* on “Free Will as a Natural Kind,” Episode 52, February 6
- 2019 Interviewee on *AI Australia Podcast* on “Bias in Machine Learning,” April 18
- 2018 Industry/government workshop, Data61/ Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO)/ Department of Innovation Industry and Science (DIIS): Developing an Ethics Framework for AI in Australia, November 13
- 2018 Panelist, Open Fishbowl Discussion on “Ethics and AI,” Responsible AI Event, Zendesk Offices, 395 Collins Street, Melbourne, Australia, June 21

TEACHING

- 2023 Modes of Reasoning: Techniques of Persuasion (MODR 1770), York University
 2023 Artificial Intelligence (COMP 2400), Macquarie University
 2020 Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (COGS PHIL 3750), York University
 2020 Modes of Reasoning: Techniques of Persuasion (MODR 1770), York University
 2019 Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility (PHIL 2170), York University
 2019 Modes of Reasoning: Techniques of Persuasion (MODR 1770), York University
 2019 Philosophy of Mind (ATS 2840), Monash University
 2019 Critical Thinking (ATS 2946 online), Monash University
 2018 Time, Self, and Mind (ATS 1835), Monash University
 2018 Critical Thinking (ATS 2946), Monash University
 2018 Honors Seminar in Action Theory (ATS 4869), Monash University
 2018 Philosophy of Mind (ATS 2840), Monash University
 2017 Time, Self, and Mind (ATS 1835), Monash University
 2017 Critical Thinking (ATS 2946), Monash University
 2017 Ethical Issues and Life Choices (PHI 2360-03), Florida State University
 2017 Ethical Issues and Life Choices (PHI 2360-07), Florida State University
 2016 Philosophy of Mind (PHI 6325), Florida State University
 2016 Ethical Issues and Life Choices (PHI 2360-01), Florida State University
 2016 Existential Problems (PHIL RELI 245), University of Arizona
 2015 Philosophy of Mind (PHIL COGS 450/550), University of Arizona

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Referee for: Oxford University Press (2023, 2016, 2015, 2014), *Philosophical Quarterly* (2023), *Philosophical Studies* (2023, 2021, 2016), *Erkenntnis* (2021, 2020), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (2020, 2017, 2016), *Mind* (2020, 2019), *Philosophical Explorations* (2020, 2016), *Analysis* (2019, 2018, 2017), *Synthese* (2019), *Philosophical Psychology* (2019, 2016, 2014, 2013), *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* (2018, 2017), *Philosophical Quarterly* (2018, 2016), *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (2017), *Southern Journal of Philosophy* (2017), *Cognition* (2015), *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* (2015), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (2015, 2013), MIT Press (2013)