The Fog Blog

Hello Oisin,

I'm glad you had the idea of moving the discussion here.

I'd like to be a bit more clear about what we are each saying, and why.

I began by questioning Mark's implication that humans are not the most important thing in the known universe. In part 2 of his piece he explores what it could mean to be "important", and he suggests it might involve being "better". But, he says, a wolf is better at running, and I, Mark, am better at logic, and in general the wolf is better at being a wolf, and Mark is better at being a human. You seem to be saying the same about dolphins, they have abilities too, who is to say whose abilities are better?

I am saying firstly that if those are to be the criteria for importance, then humans are
more important. In order to run better than a wolf, you get on a motorbike. Being a wolf involves killing abilities, but we killed all the wolves in my country centuries ago. We replaced wolves with better wolves (from our point of view) by using them to breed dogs. Our dogs and our motorbikes function as extensions of our own beings, and so do the sort of extended conceptualisations that enable us to breed new animals and make machines to do anything animals can do.

If we wanted to make air vortex rings like those in your captivating dolphin video, we could do it, probably in a couple of days if we really needed to. We can blow smoke rings and put our finger through them already.

The dolphins swim round all day every day, ducking their heads and breathing though their air hole. If they do that in a certain way, a vortex forms. When they mess around with the vortex, it behaves in certain (captivating) ways, and they learn to do that and use it to occupy themselves in that tank. But it's something that just happens, literally right in front of their noses.

They can't extend themselves, and this is another aspect of the crucial difference between us, what makes us more "important" than them (although I certainly wouldn't have chosen that word).

You frankly acknowledge that you "dearly want" to call the dolphin rings art, but if you're going to be serious and fair you have to acknowledge openly that they are not art. They are not art, because art has an extended meaning.

That could be used to exemplify the gap between humans and all the other animals.

Of course they do have intelligence, I've never denied that, but they don't have the type of intelligence we have, which is transcendent, which allows us to get outside of ourselves and our situation, in the way I have been calling "extension".

So, I think you have no reason to be baffled at me, because I accept animals have intelligence, but I am still baffled at you, and even more so now you say you think dolphins have moral responsibilities.

Hi Bernie,

Yes, I thought it would be more appropriate to move any further discussion over here. I also think it's worth trying to be a bit more clear about what each of us is saying. But I do have a concern that we may end up going around in circles. It may simply be that I have one intuition, while you have another. Sometimes it's possible to sort such situations out with a bit of clear argument, but sometimes not. Sometimes people just ground out in very different ways of viewing things, with no clear way to decide between them. This happens all the time in the free will debate, for instance, between compatibilists and incompatibilists.

I also have a concern that our discussion involves a host of "big-ticket items" -- relating, for example, to value, the nature of intelligence, etc. I doubt that a wide-ranging discussion on a blog is likely to resolve all the disputes there may be between us on all these matters. But it's probably worth saying a little more about some of them.

I agree with some of the comments on Mark's blog; I don't see any necessary connection between humanism and the idea that humans are either (a) the only important thing or (b) the most important thing in the known universe. I think Mark could have made his point about there being no objective standard of usefulness we can appeal to in order to decide between what is "better" for a wolf or a human without mentioning humanism. I think there is a tendency in humanism to be anthropocentric, but I thought the commenters were correct in pointing out that the specific claims (a) and (b) above didn't follow from Marks' definitions.

You write:

But, he says, a wolf is better at running, and I, Mark, am better at logic, and in general the wolf is better at being a wolf, and Mark is better at being a human. You seem to be saying the same about dolphins, they have abilities too, who is to say whose abilities are better?

I am saying firstly that if those are to be the criteria for importance, then humans are more important. In order to run better than a wolf, you get on a motorbike. Being a wolf involves killing abilities, but we killed all the wolves in my country centuries ago. We replaced wolves with better wolves (from our point of view) by using them to breed dogs. Our dogs and our motorbikes function as extensions of our own beings, and so do the sort of extended conceptualizations that enable us to breed new animals and make machines to do anything animals can do.

If we wanted to make air vortex rings like those in your captivating dolphin video, we could do it, probably in a couple of days if we really needed to. We can blow smoke rings and put our finger through them already.

I think we have deeply different ways of approaching things.

First, I happen to think that wolves are incredibly beautiful creatures, and I have been fortunate enough to see a few of them myself deep in the wilds of Canada (They have not, thankfully, been killed off here! There are a great many wolves still roaming the wilderness here.) So wolves have at least aesthetic value, for me and for others. Part of their aesthetic value, for me as for many others, is that they are wild creatures and not living in captivity, for example in a zoo. Indeed, seeing large predators such as wolves or big cats in a zoo is deeply depressing (I think). I also think there are good arguments that establish wolves' extrinsic value to environments. The reintroduction of wolves (from Canada) to Yellowstone Park in the U.S. had far-reaching and unforeseen effects on that ecosystem, most of which have been positive. Of course, there are other criteria which establish value for wolves independently of their value to us, such as the utilitarian criterion of sentience: wolves are creatures with interests of their own, and are able to suffer.

Second, you write "In order to run better than a wolf you get on a motorbike". This is silly. So allow me to be (somewhat) silly in response. I happen to ride a motorbike myself, and I've also spent a good deal of time deep in the wilderness in Canada, where wolves live. You cannot compete with a wolf in chasing down prey by riding a motorbike. For a start, there are no roads, and the terrain is entirely unsuitable even for a dirt bike. Anyone who is serious about accessing the deep wilderness in Canada does so on horseback, or by float-plane. Even a helicopter is not ideal since it needs level open spaces to land. In the case of both horses and machines, you need fuel. Any prey you capture will not suffice for fuel, since horses are vegetarian (and for obvious reasons in the case of machines). A wolf can run in mixed terrain for long periods of time, going into fuel "deficit", and its prey constitutes its fuel. In any case, you wouldn't want to be trying to chase down your dinner on a horse (as nimble as they can be!). And neither a plane nor a helicopter is ideal as a method of hunting. By all means, you can do it. And of course we have the sheer power to just blanket bomb the entire forest and pick up whatever meat is left over. There is, after all, no question -- I assume -- about our sheer ability and power to kill; I'm bound to grant you that we're marvelously better at it than are wolves. In any case, your point about "outrunning" a wolf is valid only if you pit a human on a motorbike against a wolf in a drag race over level ground. (In a less silly vein, I grant, as I have indicated above, that we can overwhelm, overpower, and even "outrun" wolves by sheer ingenuity and our machinery if it really comes down to it. But wolves are wonderfully adapted to their environment in ways in which we are arguably not.)

As regards dolphin art: yes, you are right; I am, of course, not quite prepared to equate the dolphins' antics in the video with human art (although I doubt that much of the latter would mean anything at all to any creature other than a human). However, there is a curiosity here: many of the artists I know -- whether jazz musicians, painters, actors, etc. -- are not ever overly concerned (or even at all concerned) with "extended meaning", as you put it. Philosophers of art often point to such an idea as being important, but I must admit that I have yet to find an artist of almost any stripe who is primarily interested in the philosophy of art, or in "extended meaning", and so forth. Mostly, they are not even remotely interested in such things. They like making things. And often they predominantly like having fun. Time and again I see that one of the main motivators for the actual creativity involved in producing art is that the artists like having fun. And this, of course, is precisely what the dolphins are doing with their bubbles. That was my point.

As regards intelligence, I'd like to write a separate post on this topic. But a few words here: First, I don't think intelligence is the correct criterion according to which we should judge what is and isn't valuable (or at least morally valuable). For one thing, it would deny value to the following types of humans: infants, the senile, the mentally retarded. Also, it's entirely arbitrary. But aside from these issues, I'm interested in what we mean by "intelligence" in the first place. I know that some recent theories of intelligence allow for multiple different kinds of intelligence, even among humans. I think this is right. Howard Gardner, for instance, allows for at least eight types of intelligence: logical, linguistic, spatial, musical, kinesthetic, naturalist, intrapersonal and interpersonal. This is surely the right direction in which to go with regard to the issue of intelligence. Most of our tests for intelligence only measure the logical and linguistic sorts. For obvious reasons, then, philosophers tend to prioritize these sorts. However, I have known very *intelligent* philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, linguists, and so on, who have been miserably stupid in other areas, for example, both intra- and interpersonally. I've also known people who had high spatial and kinesthetic intelligence -- who are, for example, exceptionally good at field games such as soccer. They always *know* where to be, and they *read* the flow of the game, and so on. Many sports commentators refer to such athletes as "intelligent", and I think they are correct (though the athletes involved may perform poorly on standard IQ tests, for example). For myself, I was never very good at field games, even though I used to be quite athletic; I became aware early on that I was in some sense *stupid* at them. I never *knew* where to be, and could seldom *read* the flow of the game. The ball would be passed to where I was supposed to be, and I wouldn't be there. Likewise, a philosophy student (for example!) working at a skilled manual labouring job for the summer -- say, as a carpenter's helper -- may correctly be thought to be hopelessly *stupid* by carpenters when it comes to the practical intelligence required by that job. Indeed, I've often heard tradespeople bemoan the *stupidity* of their otherwise (at least supposedly) bright temporary employees. A carpenter will laugh and shake his or her head, wondering at the sheer *stupidity* of such supposedly *intelligent* people.

If there are really such different kinds of intelligence within the category "human", then I should think it hardly surprising that there are, or at least may be, different sorts of intelligence across species. Indeed, I would think it entirely plausible that there are radically different sorts of intelligence across even the species of which we are aware -- for instance, in dolphins. Incidentally, I think it is one of the virtues of White's using the EQ (encephalization quotient) measurement in attempting to give a comparative analysis of human and dolphin intelligence. EQ, according to White, is based on the relation of body weight to brain weight. We subtract the part of the brain needed to run the body, and what is left connotes more or less pure cognitive ability. EQ therefore presumably correlates with the capacity for cognitive and behavioural complexity in a species, and so it is convenient for making comparisons across species. And dolphins aren't far behind us in EQ.

Anyhow, you have already granted that you accept that non-human animals are intelligent. But you write: "I am still baffled at you, and even more so now you say you think dolphins have moral responsibilities."

But I did not claim this. I think dolphins are due moral consideration, in virtue of their being sentient creatures with highly developed self-interests, and so on. Depending on how we cash out what a "person" is, they may even be persons. However, in order for them to be morally responsible, they would either need to have certain abilities which they don't have, or they would need to have more of these abilities than they do have. A classic example would be the ability to be generally responsive to reasons (John Martin Fischer's criterion), or the ability to use practical reason.

Of course -- and here I admit to holding a view (which I defend adamantly) which not many others share -- I think that there are ways in which many of us think that we are morally responsible which no creature or being actually is morally responsible (dolphins and humans alike). So I would contend both that (a) humans and dolphins are more alike than we normally concede in terms of their being (not) morally responsible in this -- important -- respect; and (b) dolphins may be more responsive to reasons and have a higher capacity for using practical reason than we think.

However, I admit that I'm entering contentious territory here, especially with (b); so the burden of proof is on me to prove my case.

But I think that there is some support to be had. If you haven't read White's book in its entirety, I would certainly recommend that you do so. I don't have the space or time here to reproduce the many anecdotes and studies he cites, but many of them strongly support the notions that dolphins are able to represent the causal structure of their environment so as to be able to actually solve puzzles in complex situations, that they are able to operate in foreign cognitive environments, that they can solve problems by thinking in innovative ways, and that they display cognitive flexibility in problem solving; moreover, they have been known -- it would seem -- to actively seek human assistance in problem solving in the wild. They also understand and use artificial languages in novel ways.

In sum, dolphins display a surprising ability to reason their way to solutions, whether by reflecting on the contents of their consciousness, handling abstract notions in order to grasp the causal structure of their environment, or understanding a given problem well enough to be able to create original behaviours and strategies as a solution. I would be reluctant to attribute moral responsibility to dolphins quite yet, but I think the evidence White lays out is intriguing and certainly gives us pause.

For me, it provides an opportunity for what I have always valued most about philosophy, which is to reevaluate my assumptions.

Hi Oisin,

It doesn't matter how much admiration of the beauty of wolves, dolphins etc you bring to bear, you are no nearer to bridging the gap between us and the other animals.

You're not doing either side justice. You're not being fair to the animals when you judge their value in terms of their utility to you, in a way they can't reciprocate. A hungry wolf can't decide not to eat you because it admires your beauty. You're not being fair to humans when you fail to acknowledge the nature and extent of the distinction between us and animals.

Our capacities are of a different order to theirs. Our decisions about how to treat them have to be taken in the knowledge that they can't make such decisions about how to treat us. It doesn't help animals or people to blur the distinction between us, it doesn't help a dolphin to call it a "person". It can't play the role of a person, we can't interact with it as we could with a person. Ascribing value to the animals on the basis of qualities they don't possess is storing up trouble for them. Denying (uniquely) human capacities like self-determination will lead to problems for both humans and animals.

The original question was about whether humans are the most important thing in the known world. We haven't said much about what "most important" means, but we humans are the only ones deciding what will happen, life or death and everything in between, to ourselves and to the others. The animals can't decide to do things like that, and we can. We find ourselves in a position where we are responsible for animals, and not vice versa. That sounds very like "most important" to me.

I guess I just think that non-human animals are more than we acknowledge, while we human animals are less than we tend to think -- I do think that we are a bit too self-important sometimes.

Or, in other words, non-human animals are more like us than we had previously thought, while human animals are less unlike non-human animals than we had thought.

Our (relatively) unique abilities may make us more powerful than non-human animals. But where is the connection between power and importance? More or less in line with the point Mark Rowlands was making, it seems to me that power, if that's the criterion we're focusing on, is just as arbitrary as any other criterion we might choose. Even allowing for the sort of difference between us and non-human animals that I'm willing to grant (i.e., a gap, but hardly an unbridgeable one), I just fail to see why those abilities we have that non-human animals lack, or which we have to a greater degree (if we do), make us more important. Why? How?

Maybe we're just the most self-important (i.e., conceited) thing in the universe after all. ;)